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Abstract 
 
Since 1970 era, the discussion about fiscal decentralization becomes an important 
subject. A recent World Bank study found that of the 75 developing and transition countries 
in the world with populations greater than 5 million, all but 12 claim to be embarked on 
some transfer of fiscal power from the central to sub national governments. This is a revolu-
tion of how people think fiscally. The subject has also attracted many researchers to explore 
the decentralization system. As such many researchers mainly try to focus that fiscal decen-
tralization would have a significant effect on economic growth. Empirically, these research-
ers also prove that the decentralization approach of a nation's fiscal structure is an effective 
strategy to promote economic growth. The central structure of fiscal decentralization is the 
degree that creates growth-promoting decentralization systems that distinguish decentraliza-
tion system capabilities in promoting economic growth to a greater or lesser degree. Hence, 
this paper will provide the empirical evidence for selected Muslim countries where these 
countries adopt the differences approaches in fiscal decentralization, i.e., transition coun-
tries versus countries with a well-functioning fiscal system.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in the early 1970s, most 
developing and transitional countries have 
been either embarked upon or stated their 
intention to embark upon some type of fiscal 
decentralization initiative. A recent World 
Bank study found that of the 75 developing 
and transition countries in the world with 
populations greater than 5 million, all but 12 
claim to be embarked on some transfer of 
fiscal power from the central to sub-national 
governments.  
As a result, there has been many of 
policy discussions on the application and 
influence of fiscal decentralization.1 However, 
                                               
1Refer to world bank’s website, publications.worldbank.org 
the focus is descriptive in nature, concentrat-
ing on describing the various types of decen-
tralization programs in different countries or 
on analyzing the motivations for or implica-
tions of these programs. Consequently, most 
of the findings are based on rather vague, 
and sometimes, dubious or biased informa-
tion.  
In contrast, the empirical evidence 
quantifying the effects of fiscal decentraliza-
tion has been limited to examine the impact 
of fiscal decentralization on economic 
growth. The samples are limited to a group 
of countries, for example developed and 
developing countries (e.g. Jin and Zao 
(2002)) or a single country for example 
United States (e.g. Akai and Sakata (2002)) 
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and China (e.g. Zhang and Zou (1998). The 
results are also mixed. There is no such em-
pirical evidence used the data in Muslim 
countries, although the fiscal decentraliza-
tion was introduced in the Muslim era dur-
ing the early days.  
Hence, this paper is an attempt to ex-
amine the effects of fiscal decentralization 
on economic growth in selected Muslim 
countries. Using an econometric analysis of 
a panel of 4 Muslim countries, we try to 
demonstrate how the allocation of fiscal 
revenues and expenditures between the na-
tional government and sub-national govern-
ments affect economic growth. The study is 
motivated by combining countries with dif-
ferent approaches and degree of fiscal de-
centralization. We find that expenditure de-
centralization leads to smaller economic 
growth.   
The remaining discussion of this pa-
per is organized as follows. The second sec-
tion will discuss the theoretical background. 
Then, the model, data sources and descrip-
tion will be explained in section three. The 
stylized facts about the fiscal decentraliza-
tion in the selected Muslim countries are 
discussed in section four. The regression 
results are reported in section five. Section 
six is produces the conclusions and sugges-
tion for further research.   
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
A common question in the literature 
on economic growth is whether all fluctua-
tions are alike.  However, the current studies 
(among others Barro (1991), Mankiw, Ro-
mer and Weil (1992), and Fatas (2000)) 
show that the differences in economic 
growth across countries provide a good 
benchmark to test the predictions of alterna-
tive theories of the cause of economic fluc-
tuations. Nelson and Plosser (1982) argue 
that the output fluctuations are driven by 
aggregate demand (such as monetary distur-
bances). However, other researchers con-
sider to include domestic and foreign capital 
(see, Balasubramanyam, Salisu and Sapsford 
(1996)); inflation rate (see, DeGregorio (1992), 
Fischer (1993)); and financial development 
(see, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and 
De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995)); as an 
additional explanatory variable or as a test 
of individual variable such as export (see, 
Balassa (1978), Feder (1982), and Frankel 
and Romer (1999)); population (see, Kapuria-
Foreman (1995) and Darrat and Al-Yousif 
(1999)).  The inclusion of these variables are 
to ascertain the differences in growth rates 
across countries.  
A few researchers such as Barro 
(1991) and Fisher (1993) add the size of the 
government sector as an important factor to 
economic growth. However, the failure of 
centralized economies worldwide has rein-
forced faith in the vitality of market-driven 
economies. Hence, advocates of an ex-
panded role of government are in retreat.  
The government’s role is largely im-
portant to provide the environment through 
which profit-maximizing firms can respond 
swiftly to consumer needs. Therefore, there 
is a need to assess the effects of the general 
flow of government services on the produc-
tivity of the private sector of an economy 
and more specifically, the impact of public 
sector investment on private decision-
making.  
Here, government activity may indi-
rectly increase the total output of a country 
through its interaction with the private sec-
tor. It provides that public goods and ser-
vices such as legal and social framework 
which enhance the voluntary exchange rela-
tionship and productivity of society through 
the enforcement of property rights. Addi-
tionally, government has authority to re-
move or regulate negative externalities. A 
government can provide the economic infra-
structure to facilitate economic growth and 
improve resource allocation. Government 
transfer payments can help to maintain so-
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cial harmony and improve labor force pro-
ductivity. Government can also prevent for-
eign exploitation and its military defense can 
improve capital security and government 
expenditure on health and education can 
improve labor force vibrancy and productiv-
ity. Finally, subsidies to targeted export in-
dustries can improve trade balance and ac-
celerate economic growth.   
Therefore, lately, many economists 
such as Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 
(2001) and Jin and Zou (2002) have sug-
gested the effectiveness of the government’s 
role in public service provision and created a 
presumption in favor of reducing the size of 
the public sector by giving more power to 
sub-national governments. Hence, fiscal 
decentralization is seen as a mechanism to 
control the growth of the public sector. Both 
also argue that the increased interest on fis-
cal decentralization appears to be fueled by 
their belief that fiscal decentralization is an 
effective tool to produce an efficient gov-
ernance, macroeconomic stability, and ade-
quate economic growth. In addition, the rush 
to decentralize can also be seen as a reaction 
to the failure of many centralized economies 
in developing and transition countries. Here, 
decentralization is seen as a way to break the 
central government’s grip on the economy 
by shifting fiscal authority to sub-national 
governments.  
The growing interest in fiscal decen-
tralization has encouraged many researchers 
to produce an empirical works for different 
sample of countries. The empirical works 
are limited to examine the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on economic growth. The 
results are also mixed. The recent empirical 
evidences focusing on those relationships 
include Zhang and Zou (1998), Davoodi and 
Zou (1998), Woller and Phillips (1998), Lin 
and Liu (2000), and Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab (2001). These studies produce many 
arguments to channel the effect of fiscal 
decentralization on economic growth.  In the 
first channel, they use the production func-
tion with two inputs: production capital and 
public spending. The introduction of public 
spending by different levels of government 
would create a potential link between fiscal 
decentralization (i.e. differential effects of 
spending by the two levels of government) 
and growth. 
  In the second channel, they believe 
that government spending would increase 
economic efficiency, since sub-national 
governments are better positioned to deliver 
public services and goods that match local 
preferences and needs than the national gov-
ernment. Over time, efficiency gains lead to 
fast sub-national as well as national eco-
nomic growth. 
However, the provision of public 
goods and services may encourage the sub-
national government to increase taxes. Then, 
taxation may distort economic incentives 
towards savings and investment which later 
may not generate the economic growth.  
  
METHODOLOGY 
Following Xie et al. (1999), and Akai 
and Sakata (2002), the model that relate the 
fiscal decentralization and growth can be 
written as: 
gi,c = α0 + α1 Di,c + α2 Xi,c  + ei................. (1) 
where i and c refer to state i and country c; g 
represents the annual growth rate of per cap-
ita gross state product; D represents indica-
tors of fiscal decentralization in state i; X is 
control variables comprising state character-
istics; and e is an error term.  
In this study, we use three different 
measures of fiscal decentralization as sug-
gested by Akai and Sakata (2002), i.e., the 
ratio of sub-national government revenue to 
total government revenue (revenue indica-
tor, RI), the ratio of sub-national govern-
ment expenditure to total government ex-
penditure (production indicator, PI), and the 
production-revenue indicator (PRI), i.e., 
(PI+RI)/2.  
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We also include a large number of 
country economic characteristics in the em-
pirical model to capture all the relevant eco-
nomic effects on growth after controlling for 
differences across countries. Following Ro-
mer (1987), we simplify the growth model 
that can be explained by either growth of 
labor or growth of capital and the residual. 
Within this framework, we will investigate 
the residual by looking at the role of various 
economic policies that a number of the 
"new" growth theories have identified as 
potential determinants of economic growth. 
We will provide a brief summary here. 
Inflation. Appropriate use of mone-
tary policy is thought to promote a stable 
financial environment necessary for eco-
nomic growth by maintaining a low inflation 
rate. We use, as suggested by DeGregorio 
(1992) and Fischer (1993), the rate of infla-
tion as our indicator of the effects of mone-
tary policy and macroeconomic stability.  
Openness. The role of international 
trade in economic growth has been debated 
for over two centuries. The studies of 
Balassa (1978) and Frankel and Romer 
(1999) have included an indicator of export 
performance in explaining economic growth. 
They produce a proposition that more out-
ward-oriented economies tend to grow 
faster. This proposition has been tested ex-
tensively and the majority of the evidence 
tends to support this proposition.2 A meas-
ure frequently used is the share of trade (ex-
port plus import) in GDP. We believe that 
this to be a preferable measure of openness; 
economies that adopt more outward-looking 
policies will experience faster growth in this 
ratio.3  
Financial development. Since the 
pioneering contributions of McKinnon 
                                               
2 For most recent overview and empirical testing of this 
proposition, see Frankel and Romer (1999).  
3 This finding is supported by Balasubramanyam, Salisu 
and Sapsford (1996)).  
(1973), the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth has re-
mained an important issue of debate. In re-
cent years, a number of authors (among oth-
ers, Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Green-
wood and Jovanovic (1990), and De 
Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) have dealt 
with different aspects of this relationship at 
the both the theoretical and empirical levels. 
The indicator that they choose when report-
ing results from cross-country regressions 
was the log of domestic credit.  
Since the estimation for equation (1) 
uses the panel data and relate to individual 
country, so there is subject to be heterogene-
ity in these countries over time. In order to 
take such heterogeneity explicitly into ac-
count in our estimation procedure, several 
assumptions about the error term have to be 
made. Therefore, in our estimation, three 
different errors are assumed, i.e., fixed, ran-
dom and time effects.     
All countries that are included in our 
study have data for at least two levels of 
government in the International Monetary 
Fund’s Government Financial Statistics 
(GFS). Based on the availability of data, 
primarily at the sub-national level, we end 
up with 4 out of 57 countries (refer to 
www.sesrtcic.org or the list of OIC member 
countries). These countries are Indonesia 
(from 1976 to 2000), Kazakhstan (from 
1996 to 2000), Kyrgyzstan (from 1996 to 
2000), and Malaysia (from 1973 to 2000).  
 
STYLIZED FACTS 
Table 1 provides some descriptive 
statistics on government sizes for each coun-
try. On average, public sectors at sub-
national and national for the selected coun-
tries stand at 5.3% and 21.0% respectively. 
Moreover, sub-national government size 
varies less significantly compared to na-
tional government size as indicated by the 
standard deviation (1.3% versus 2.1%). The 
descriptive statistics of each countries show 
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that in selected Muslim countries, sub-
national government size varies from 2.7% 
of GDP in Indonesia to 7.2% in Kyrgyzstan. 
Over the same time period, the national gov-
ernment size ranges from 17.4% of GDP in 
Kyrgyzstan to 24.5% in Malaysia.  
As indicated earlier, three different 
variables are used to proxy the level of fiscal 
decentralization: revenue indicator (meas-
ured as the ratio of sub-national government 
revenue to total government revenue), pro-
duction indicator (measured as the ratio of 
sub-national government expenditure to total 
government expenditure), and production-
revenue indicator (measured as half of the 
sum of revenue and expenditure indicators). 
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics 
of these fiscal decentralization measures for 
each country. Generally, revenues are 0.1% 
more decentralized than expenditure as 
shown by the mean values. In addition, tran-
sition countries (Kazakhstan and Kyr-
gyzstan) are more decentralized than others 
(Indonesia and Malaysia) in both revenues 
and expenditures (32.9% and 18.1% for 
transition countries versus 2.7% to 14.3% 
for others). Production-revenue indicator is 
larger in the transition countries than in 
other countries (i.e, 31.0% and 21.4%, and 
6.4% and 15.0%, respectively).  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of government sizes for each country 
 
Sub-national government size National government size 
Country 
Mean Max Min S.D. Mean Max Min S.D. 
Indonesia 0.027 0.035 0.021 0.004 0.194 0.237 0.161 0.021 
Kyrgyzstan 0.072 0.084 0.063 0.008 0.174 0.183 0.164 0.008 
Kazakhstan 0.052 0.069 0.035 0.024 0.228 0.242 0.214 0.020 
Malaysia  0.059 0.098 0.035 0.016 0.245 0.375 0.182 0.034 
Average 0.053 0.072 0.039 0.013 0.210 0.259 0.180 0.021 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of federal decentralization measures for each country 
 
Revenue indicator Production indicator Production-revenue indicator 
Country 
Mean Max Min S.D. Mean Max Min S.D. Mean Max Min S.D. 
Indonesia 0.027 0.037 0.016 0.006 0.101 0.125 0.055 0.021 0.064 0.081 0.036 0.013 
Kyrgyzstan 0.181 0.266 0.146 0.049 0.247 0.266 0.234 0.012 0.214 0.266 0.190 0.030 
Kazakhstan 0.329 0.351 0.291 0.025 0.291 0.345 0.209 0.066 0.310 0.345 0.250 0.045 
Malaysia  0.143 0.179 0.106 0.022 0.157 0.216 0.108 0.026 0.150 0.176 0.107 0.019 
Average 0.170 0.209 0.137 0.025 0.202 0.245 0.152 0.030 0.186 0.221 0.146 0.019 
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REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table 3 reports the regression results 
on how fiscal decentralization affects eco-
nomic growth using the fixed-, random- and 
time-effects approach. These results are 
based on three different types of indicator 
for fiscal decentralization. By comparing the 
P-values of Hausman tests, we could con-
clude that the fixed-effects produce better 
results.  
The empirical findings can be stated 
as follows. The primary finding is that the 
estimated coefficients on fiscal decentraliza-
tion (rows 2, 3 and 4, Table 3) are negative 
and statistically significant at the 5% levels. 
This finding provides evidence that fiscal 
decentralization contributes to smaller eco-
nomic growth. It is important to note that 
this finding is not consistent with the results 
in previous studies. Moreover, it should be 
emphasized that production and production-
revenue indicators, which are similar to 
Akai and Sakata (2002), are negatively 
signed and statistically insignificant in a 
regression with an unbalanced set of data. 
However, our data set has the advantage that 
variations between observations are rela-
tively small, which facilitates adjustment for 
country-specific effects. 
Concerning the estimated coefficients 
of other country characteristics, some con-
clusions appear from the results in Table 3. 
While some variables significantly affect 
economic growth, others have insignificant 
coefficients. Detailed discussion follows. 
First, we have controlled for the roles 
capital by using variable i.e., the ratio of 
gross fixed capital formation to GDP or 
growth of capital, respectively. The growth 
of capital has the expected positive effect, 
which is statistically significant in regres-
sions that include production indicator (col-
umn 3, Table 3). This result means that the 
variable represents the real benefit of capital 
formation for the effect on economic 
growth. 
Second, the estimated coefficient of 
the ratio of the sum of imports and exports 
to GDP is negative and significant at the 1% 
level in all regression models. This means 
that the degree of openness isn’t an impor-
tant determinant of economic growth on that 
selected countries. 
Third, the estimated coefficient of 
bank credit is positive, as expected, and sig-
nificant at the 1% level in all regressions 
(row 6, Table 3). The results support the 
hypothesis that the effects of financial in-
termediation on growth, as indicated by 
most of the literature, are primarily transmit-
ted through an increase in the bank credit of 
the banking system. Finally, significant co-
efficients were observed for inflation rate. 
 
Table 3: Decentralization and economic growth (fixed effects) 
 
Dependent variable: per capita growth rate Explanatory variable Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
Revenue indicator 0.5713 (0.1804)* 
_ _ 
Production indicator _ -0.0759  (0.0727) 
_ 
Production-revenue indicator _ _ -0.0674  (0.1160) 
Ratio of gross fixed capital for-
mation to GDP 
0.6081 
(0.0246)* 
0.4196  
(0.0183)* 
0.6078  
(0.0220)* 
Ratio of the sum of imports and 
exports to GDP 
-0.1669  
(0.0100)* 
-0.0534 
(0.0050)* 
-0.1281  
(0.0082)* 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This paper is an attempt to examine 
the effects of fiscal decentralization on eco-
nomic growth in some selected muslim 
countries. Using an econometric analysis of 
a panel of 4 selected muslim countries, we 
find that revenue decentralization leads to 
economic growth. The expenditure decen-
tralization leads to smaller economic growth 
and the production-revenue indicator also 
leads to smaller economic growth. Control-
ling for country variables, the analysis show 
that fiscal decentralization plays an impor-
tant role in the selected countries. As indi-
cated, the results also indicate that several 
other factors, i.e. the degree of openness and 
bank credit affect economic growth. Finally, 
it is important to note that, although the re-
sults of this paper provide evidence of a 
contribution to economic growth. Further 
researches that look at the legal system in 
these countries are worth to be explored. 
Because the central structure of fiscal decen-
tralization is the legal system that creates 
growth-promoting decentralization systems 
that distinguish decentralization system ca-
pabilities in promoting economic growth to 
a greater or lesser degree. From this perspec-
tive, a well-functioning legal system will 
facilitate the operation of both government 
and fiscal decentralization that improves the 
efficient allocation of resources and eco-
nomic growth.  
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